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CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - DESPITE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN PRIOR DESCRIPTION AND DEFENDANT'S ACTUAL APPEARANCE, EYEWITNESS' TESTIMONY OF
PRETRIAL AND IN-COURT IDENTIFICATIONS OF DEFENDANT IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION.
Branch v. State, 305 Md. 177, 502 A.2d 496 (1986).
A woman was robbed at gunpoint by two men 1 and immediately
reported the incident to the police. 2 The woman described the gunman
as a black male, five feet seven inches tall, fifteen to sixteen years of age,
and weighing 110 to 125 pounds. 3 Three and one-half hours after the
incident, the investigating officer had the woman look through two books
containing approximately 600 photographs, but the woman was unable
to identify the gunman. The officer then took from his pocket three photographs, one of which the woman identified as the gunman. The defendant, when the incident occurred, was six feet three inches tall,
nineteen years of age, weighed 185 pounds, and had two front teeth missing.4 At the jury trial, the woman identified the defendant as the gunman. 5 Despite the discrepancies between the woman's initial description
of the gunman and the physical appearance of the defendant, 6 the jury
found the defendant guilty of robbery with a deadly weapon and use of a
handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. 7 The conviction was
affirmed by both the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 8 and the
Court of Appeals of Maryland. 9 The court of appeals held that the identification testimony of a single eyewitness was sufficient as a matter of
law to sustain the conviction. 10
If an appeal is based upon a due process violation that alleges insufficiency of evidence, the reviewing court must determine whether the record evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding of guilt. In Jackson
1. Beatrice Mudge was robbed by two black men on April 14, 1983 at approximately

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

8.
9.
10.

7:00 a.m. while walking to work. One of the men pointed a gun at her and grabbed
her purse while the other acted as the lookout. The men escaped on foot. Brief for
Appellant at 2, Branch v. State, 305 Md. 177, 502 A.2d 496 (1986).
Branch, 305 Md. at 178, 502 A.2d at 496.
I d. at 178, 502 A.2d at 496. The description also identified the gunman as wearing a
dark jacket and carrying a silver handgun. Id.
Id. at 179, 502 A.2d at 496.
Id. at 179, 502 A.2d at 497.
Id. at 185, 502 A.2d at 500. The defense also presented two alibi witnesses. The
defendant's girlfriend testified that she was in bed with the defendant in the bedroom they shared at her mother's house until approximately 10:00 a.m. on the
morning of the robbery. The defendant's aunt testified that on April 14, 1983 at
approximately 10:00 a.m. she went to the home of the defendant's girlfriend where
she found the defendant dressed in his nightclothes in the bedroom. Id.
The defendant was sentenced to fifteen years for robbery with a deadly weapon and
five years for the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, to run
consecutively. Brief for Appellant at 1-2, Branch v. State, 305 Md. 177, 502 A.2d
496 (1986).
Branch v, State, No. 84-351, slip op. (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 4, 1984).
Branch, 305 Md. 177, 502 A.2d 496.
Id. at 184, 502 A.2d at 499.

1986]

Branch v. State

181

v. Virginia, 11 the Supreme Court established a constitutional standard for
appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence. Concluding that due process requires the use of the reasonable doubt standard at all levels of the
criminal process, 12 the Court held that courts reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence must determine whether any rational fact finder, after reviewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.B Maryland courts have developed a sufficiency standard which is consistent with that espoused in Jackson. 14
A majority of jurisdictions hold that the uncorroborated testimony
of a single eyewitness is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. 15 Professor Wigmore states the rule as follows: "In general, the testimony of a
single witness, no matter what the issue or who the person, may legally
suffice as evidence upon which the jury may found [sic] a verdict." 16
Courts follow this "one-witness" rule because the testimony of an eyewitness is frequently the only evidence in the prosecution's case and is perhaps the most convincing evidence that the prosecution can offer a jury
11. 443 u.s. 307 (1979).
12. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment protects a defendant against conviction except
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime charged. Prior to Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), a federal habeas
corpus court would find a state conviction unconstitutional only if the charge were
totally devoid of evidentiary support. See Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199
(1960).
13. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EviDENCE§ 2495, at 391 (Chadbourn
rev. 1981).
14. Williams v. State, 5 Md. App. 450,459,247 A.2d 731,737 (1968); accord Bedford v.
State, 293 Md. 172, 176 n.1, 443 A.2d 78, 80 n.1 (1982); State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230,
240, 424 A.2d 720, 728 (1981). Maryland established appellate review of sufficiency
of evidence in criminal cases in 1950 by constitutional amendment. Mo. CONST.
art. XV § 6 (prior to 1950 amendment) provided, "In the trial of all criminal cases,
the Jury shall be the Judges of the Law, as well as of fact." Mo. CoNST. D. OF R.,
art. 23 (art. XV as amended in 1950, and transferred to Declaration of Rights)
provides: "In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as
well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain a conviction." See generally Williams, 5 Md. App. 450, 247 A.2d 731
(tracing statutory development of appellate review of sufficiency); Editorial, Criminal Procedurai Reform Achieved in Maryland, 11 Mo. L. REv. 319 (1950) (reviewing the effects of the amendment as adopted in November 1950 election). The first
case to apply this amendment was Shelton v. State, 198 Md. 405, 84 A.2d 76 (1951),
in which the court of appeals held that it would not reverse the judgment of the
lower court if there were any proper evidence before the jury that would sustain a
conviction. /d. at 412, 84 A.2d at 80.
15. See, e.g., U.S. v. Larios, 640 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1981);U.S. v. Hoskins, 628 F.2d 295
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987 (1980); U.S. v. Danzey, 594 F.2d 905 (2nd
Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 951 (1979); Shelton v. State, 382 So. 2d 1175 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1980); I.R. v. State, 385 So. 2d 686 (Fla. App. 1980); People v. Perez, 94
Ill. App. 3d 377, 418 N.E.2d 969 (1981); Sheckles v. State, 272 Ind. 509,400 N.E.2d
121 (1980); People v. Richards, 76 Mich. App. 695, 256 N.W.2d 793 (1977); State v.
Newberry, 605 S.W.2d 117 (Mo. 1980); State v. Radi, 176 Mont. 451, 578 P.2d 1169
(1978).
16. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2034, at 343 (Chadbourn rev. 1978).
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to prove the defendant's guiltY Courts also favor submitting identification evidence to juries for a determination of its accuracy because courts
credit juries with the ability to appreciate and evaluate the complexities
of eyewitness identifications. 18 Maryland courts follow the majority view
in applying the one-witness rule. 19
Several legal and psychological experts hold a contrary view. 20
These experts state that certain conditions exist that are not within the
purview of the average juror and may detract from the accuracy of eyewitness identification. 21 For example, the human mind practices selective perception that can cause a witness to a crime to fail to observe those
details that are crucial for an accurate identification. 22
Additionally, psychological studies show that perceptual abilities
are impaired when a witness is exposed to unexpected or stressful situations. The witness' defense mechanism is to focus only on aspects of a
situation that seem most important, such as an escape route or the presence of a weapon. 23 The desire to reduce uncertainty and eliminate inconsistencies may cause a witness to fill in memory gaps by adding
extraneous details to the perceived image. 24 These latent weaknesses are
exacerbated by the tendency of a jury to place great faith in eyewitness
testimony, even in the face of information that discredits it.2 5 Although
17. See United States v. Levi, 405 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1968) (discussing the rationale for
the one-witness rule and the reasons for its persistence); Woocher, Did Your Eyes
Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness
Identification, 29 STAN. L. REv. 969, 969 (1977).
18. Woocher, supra note 17, at 995-96. See generally N. SOBEL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 6-4 (2d ed. Supp. 1985) (discussing
factors considered by courts to establish reliability).
19. See, e.g., Mobley v. State, 270 Md. 76, 89, 310 A.2d 803, 811 (1973) (single eyewitness' identification of defendant as perpetrator of robbery held sufficient to convict);
Walters v. State, 242 Md. 235, 237-38, 218 A.2d 678, 678 (1966) (victim's identification is ample evidence to sustain a conviction for assault); Davis v. Warden, 235
Md. 637, 639, 201 A.2d 672, 672-73 (1964) (identification by one eyewitness, if believed, is sufficient); Coates v. State, 232 Md. 72, 74, 191 A.2d 579, 579 (1963)
(identification of accused by single eyewitness was held sufficent to sustain conviction for robbery with a deadly weapon).
20. See generally SOBEL, supra note 18, at 9-30.3 Gurors rarely perceive the dangers of
identification procedures); Woocher, supra note 17 (examining psychological dimensions of eyewitness identification as compared to factors that jurors find significant
in reviewing identification evidence); E. LoFTUs, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 9-18
(1979) (discussing the impact of eyewitness testimony on jurors).
21. Woocher, supra note 17, at 970.
22. Woocher, supra note 17, at 977-85. See generally S. BARTLEY, PRINCIPLES OF PERCEPTION (2d ed. 1969); J. MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY IN CONFLICT 11-44
(1966); Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification: The Gap from
Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1079 (1973).
23. Woocher, supra note 17, at 980.
24. /d. at 982-83. One expert characterizes the identification procedure as a multiple
choice test lacking a "none of the above" alternative. The implicit suggestion that
the criminal is present in the array may cause the witness to perceive his task as one
of identifying the person who best matches the witness' recollection. /d. at 986.
25. Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Witness, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY,
Dec. 1974, at 1114.
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psychological experiments suggest that there is no relationship between
confidence and accuracy, jurors believe assertive, confident witnesses
more readily than less confident witnesses. 26 Despite the wealth of literature indicating that eyewitness testimony is inherently unreliable but is
nonetheless frequently regarded as credible by juries, the burden of assessing the value of eyewitness testimony generally rests with the jury. 27
Recognizing that the one-witness rule may lead to unjust results because of the problems inherent in eyewitness identifications, two courts
have sought to temper its harsh effects. In United States v. Levi, 28 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit identified four
factors affecting the reliability of an uncorroborated identification by one
witness to determine whether a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification existed: 29 ( 1) the lapse of time between the occurrence of
the crime and the first confrontation; (2) the opportunity of the witness
to identify during the crime as compared to the opportunity of other
witnesses who were unable to identify; (3) the reasons for the failure to
conduct a line-up or use similar techniques short of a line-up; and (4) the
judge's appraisal of the witness' capacity to observe and remember facial
and other features. The court held that a trial judge could refuse to submit a one-witness identification case to the jury if he were not persuaded
that the identification was in all probability accurate based upon these
factors. 3° Following Levi, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in United States v. Butler, 31 also adopted a modified
application of the one-witness rule. 32
The Levi approach, which demonstrates concern with the reliability
of eyewitness identifications, finds support in the line of Supreme Court
cases dealing with the admissibility of eyewitness testimony. In a trilogy
of cases decided on the same day in 1967, the Supreme Court focused on
the constitutional implications of eyewitness testimony. In United States
v. Wade, 33 the Court held that the sixth amendment to the United States
26. /d. See a/soP. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 15-16
(1965).
27. Smith v. State, 51 Md. App. 408, 443 A.2d 985 (1982).
28. 405 F.2d 380. In Levi, the defendant moved for acquittal at the close of the government's case. The trial judge denied the motion on the basis that the record substantiated a finding of guilt. /d. at 383.
29. /d. The Levi court prefaced the test by stating that a judge should also consider the
demeanor, appearance, and degree of certainty of the witness. /d.
30. /d.
31. 636 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981).
32. /d. at 729. The defendant's claim of insufficiency of the evidence was based on the
unreliability of uncorroborated testimony and alibi proof. The court affirmed the
conviction and stated that the trial judge, in deciding whether a one-witness case
should go to the jury, must consider the following factors to determine whether the
totality of circumstances gives rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification: (1) the opportunity for identification; (2) the lighting conditions;
(3) the duration of encounters; (4) the strength of the identification; and (5) the
judge's appraisal of the witness' capacity to observe. /d.
33. 388 u.s. 218 (1967).
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Constitution provided the right to have counsel present at pretrial identification procedures. 34 The Court recognized that the dangers inherent in
eyewitness identifications and the unavoidable suggestiveness of the procedures presented a risk of unfairness to the accused, 35 and held that
counsel's presence was necessary to promote fairness and to ensure the
defendant the opportunity to fully litigate the issue of identification. 36 In
Gilbert v. California, 37 the Court held that an in-court identification derived from an uncounselled pretrial identification procedure would be excluded unless corroborated by an independent source of identification. 38
In Stovall v. Denno, 39 the Court indicated that pretrial identification procedures could violate the due process rights of the accused under the
fifth 40 and fourteenth41 amendments if such procedures were "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification. " 42
Five years later, in Neil v. Biggers, 43 the Court turned its focus from
suggestiveness of the procedure to the reliability of the identification to
determine the admissibility of identification evidence. The Court reasoned that the unreliability stemming from certain procedures, and not
34. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967).
35. Jd. at 229-35. The suggestive manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect
to the witnesses for pretrial identification is a factor contributing to the dangers
inherent in eyewitness identification. ld. at 228-29. Suggestive procedures are identification procedures conducted in a manner that suggest guilt. Placing the accused
in handcuffs or asking "is this the man?" would imply that the accused is guilty. P.
WALL, supra note 26, at 20; see also SOBEL, supra note 18, at 1-4 to 1-5.
A line-up, rather than a photo identification or show-up, should be conducted
unless circumstances make the use of the line-up impractical. A show-up will always be slightly suggestive because the witness is given no other choice. Photo identifications are also less preferable because they may be dated. Thus, a properly
conducted line-up is generally the best means for an accurate pretrial identification.
!d.
36. Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-37. The presence of counsel at the confrontation will aid the
defendant in reconstructing at trial any unfairness that occurred at the confrontation. Counsel also will be better able to detect conditions prejudicial to the defendant, reveal any improper influences, and attack the credibility of a courtroom
identification. Id. at 230-32.
37. 388 u.s. 263 (1967).
38. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272 (1967). In Gilbert, the Court attempted to
eliminate the possibility that an in-court identification would be predicated upon a
witness' pretrial identification conducted in violation of the defendant's sixth
amendment right to have counsel present. The state must show that the in-court
identification was of an independent origin and was not tainted by the illegal pretrial
procedure. Id.
39. 388 u.s. 293 (1967).
40. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "No person shall
... be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process oflaw .... " U.S.
Const. amend. V.
41. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "[N]or shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law
.... " U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
42. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
43. 409 u.s. 188 (1972).
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the suggestiveness of those procedures, violated due process. 44 The Court
identified five factors which should be applied to determine whether an
identification procured by an unnecessarily suggestive procedure is reliable:45 (1) the opportunity of the witness to observe the criminal at the
time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention; (3) the accuracy of
the witness' prior description of the criminal; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation; and (5) the length of
time between the crime and the confrontation. If these factors indicate
that the identification is reliable, evidence of the identification is admissible even though the identification was procured by an unnecessarily suggestive procedure.46
In Manson v. Brathwaite, 47 the Court reiterated its support for those
factors listed in Biggers. 48 The Court held that pretrial identifications
obtained through unnecessarily suggestive procedures are admissible provided the identification possesses features of reliability. 49 Following
Brathwaite, lower courts applied a two part test to determine whether
identification evidence procured by suggestive procedures is admissible. 50
If the procedure is not inherently suggestive, further inquiry is unnecessary and the evidence is admissible. 51 If the procedure is inherently suggestive, the reliability factors listed in Biggers must be applied. 52 The
evidence is deemed admissible only if the positive factors or reliability
44. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972).
45. Id. at 199-200.
46. Emergency or exigent circumstances sometimes require that police conduct an identification procedure in a suggestive manner in order to obtain an identification. For
example, in a situation where the only witness to the crime is critically injured, the
police may be justified in employing suggestive procedures to procure the identification. Outside of the emergency or exigent situations, the procedure will be deemed
unnecessarily suggestive. See Stovall, 388 U.S. 293.
47. 432 u.s. 98 (1977).
48. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977).
49. I d. The Court noted that in the wake of the Biggers decision, the federal courts of
appeal had developed two approaches to identification evidence: the per se approach and the reliability approach - also referred to as the totality of circumstances approach. Under the per se approach, pretrial identifications obtained
through unnecessarily suggestive procedures are per se inadmissible. This test implicates two aspects of the procedure: the degree of suggestiveness (permissive or
impermissive), and necessity (exigent or emergency circumstances may require that
the procedure be conducted before counsel can be present). The per se approach
allows the admission of testimony concerning a subsequent identification if the identification is determined to be reliable. Id. at 110 n.lO. In comparing the reliability
approach with the per se approach, the Court found that the reliability approach
best served the interests of society for determining admissibility of identification
evidence. The Court identified three societal interests: (1) preventing unreliable
evidence from reaching the jury; (2) deterring improper police procedures; and
(3) furthering the administration of justice. Id. at 111-13. The Court also indicated
two sources of distortion of an eyewitness' recollection: (1) circumstances surround-·
ing the witness' observation of the crime; and (2) later actions of the police conducting the identification procedure. ld. at 112.
50. SOBEL, supra note 18, at 4-8.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 4-9.
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outweigh the suggestiveness of the procedure. 53 Maryland courts follow
this interpretation. 54
In Branch v. State, 55 the Court of Appeals of Maryland, relying
upon the one-witness rule, held that the uncorroborated testimony of a
victim 56 is sufficient to sustain a conviction. 5 7 The court did not view the
victim's inaccurate description of the gunman as an inconsistency affecting the sufficiency of the evidence, but rather as a factor to be considered
by the jury in assessing the credibility of the witness. 58
Branch presented the Court of Appeals of Maryland with the opportunity to adopt the Levi approach 5 9 and thereby consider the reliability of
53. /d. at 4-10. Some jurisdictions specifically require the weighing of the prejudicial
effect of the suggestive procedure against the Biggers factors to determine reliability.
Under this test, only evidence found to be both suggestive and unreliable would be
suppressed. Id. at 4-10. See, e.g., U.S. v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 643 (5th Cir.) (identification procedure is not unduly suggestive when witness inadvertently observes
defendant; such identification is likely to be reliable), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1109
(1982); U.S. v. Mefford, 658 F.2d 588, 590 (8th Cir.) (photo display not suggestive;
even if photo display were suggestive, identification would have been admissible because Biggers reliability factors were satisfied), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1089 (1981).
In a third version of the two part test, courts assume the suggestiveness of the procedures and automatically proceed to the second part of the test, applying the factors
to determine whether the evidence possesses the requisite indicia of reliability. Project, Twelfth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court
and Courts of Appeals 1981-1982, 71 GEO. L.J. 339, 421 (1982).
54. See, e.g., Rustin v. State, 46 Md. App. 28, 33-36,415 A.2d 631, 634-35 (1980) (trial
court erred in admitting pretrial identification evidence when the suggestiveness of
the procedure outweighed the reliability factors); Adams v. State, 43 Md. App. 528,
542-43, 406 A.2d 637, 645-46 (1979) (suggestive line-up identification held admissible; under totality of circumstances, identification was reliable and there was no
substantial likelihood of misidentification), aff'd, 289 Md. 221, 424 A.2d 344
(1981); Bonner v. State, 43 Md. App. 518, 523, 406 A.2d 646, 649-50 (1978) (reliability factors were applied to evaluate the likelihood of misidentification; finding of
reliability precluded exclusion on basis of impermissive suggestiveness).
55. 305 Md. 177, 502 A.2d 496 (1986).
56. Although the testimony was characterized as that of a victim, the court did not
identify a difference between testimony by a victim and a nonvictim when determining the reliability of an identification. Branch v. State, 305 Md. 177, 183, 502 A.2d
496, 499 (1986).
57. /d. The court did not address the issue of suggestiveness because it was not raised
on appeal. /d. at 178 n.1, 502 A.2d at 496 n.l.
58. Id. at 183-84, 502 A.2d at 499. In the dissent, Judge Eldridge criticized the majority's harsh application of the one-witness rule. /d. at 184-90, 502 A.2d at 499-502.
Judge Eldridge responded to the arguments set forth by the parties and to the issue
of reliability of eyewitness testimony. /d. See Brief for Appellant at 8-12, Branch v.
State, 305 Md. 177, 502 A.2d 496 (1986) (citing cases demonstrating unreliability of
eyewitness identification). But see Brief for Appellee at 5-11, Branch v. State, 305
Md. 177, 502 A.2d 496 (1986) (citing cases holding that discrepancies in description
do not negate the value of subsequent identifications). Judge Eldridge discussed the
reliability factors to illustrate the unreliability of the identification and cited civil
cases in which the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized the inherent unreliability of eyewitness testimony. /d. at 186-90, 502 A.2d at 500-02. In the absence of
other indicia of reliability, Judge Eldridge argued against the application of the onewitness rule. /d. at 190, 502 A.2d at 502.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
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a witness' identification in determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Unfortunately, the Branch court adhered to the principle of stare
decisis and maintained its alliance with the majority of jurisdictions by
strictly applying the one-witness rule. 60 The one-witness rule is too convenient a mechanism for finding sufficiency. By permitting a court to
satisfy the due process standard without a meaningful review of the evidence, the majority's approach to the one-witness rule evades the
problems inherent in the area of eyewitness identifications. 61 The Levi
approach affords a more comprehensive review of the evidence. By assuring that juries hear only eyewitness testimony that passes the four
factor test for reliability, 62 the Levi approach renders a more accurate
result in jury trials. If the Maryland judiciary were to adopt the Levi
approach, it would prevent unreliable information from reaching the
jury. Consequently, fewer convictions would result from less than reliable evidence, thus serving the ultimate public policy of reducing the likelihood of convicting innocent persons.
By characterizing the discrepancy between the description of the
gunman and the actual appearance of the defendant as an element going
to the weight rather than the sufficiency of evidence, 63 the Branch court
allowed for an interpretation that the discrepancy should affect only the
jury's assessment of the credibility of the witness and should not be an
indication that the identification was unreliable. The discrepancies in
Branch indicated either an inaccurate description or a misidentification
by the witness and should have alerted the court to the questionable reliability of the identification. 64 In suggestive procedure cases, the Supreme
Court has held that an inaccurate prior description may indicate an unreliable identification. 65 The Supreme Court articulated that the driving
force behind the Wade-Gilbert-Stovall trilogy was the concern with the
problems inherent in eyewitness identification. 66 The emergence of the
reliability test set forth in Biggers suggests that the Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of looking beyond the mere fact of an eyewitness identification and focusing instead on the accuracy of that identifica60. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 20-27.
62. For the reliability test set forth in Levi, see supra text accompanying note 29. Cf
Biggers reliability factor (3), supra text accompanying note 45.
63. Branch, 305 Md. at 184, 502 A.2d at 499.
64. Compare supra text accompanying note 3 with supra text accompanying note 4.
65. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1967). In Biggers, the Court identified reliability
of an identification as the key issue in determining the validity of a due process
claim. /d. at 199. The Court stated that it was the likelihood of misidentification
that violated the right to due process. /d. at 198. Stating that "reliability is the
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony," the
Brathwaite Court magnified the importance of preventing convictions based upon
unreliable identification evidence. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
See generally Grossman, Suggestive Identifications: The Supreme Court's Due Process Test Fails to Meet its Own Criteria, 11 U. BALT. L. REv. 53, 58, 71 (1981).
66. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112.
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tion. 67 Although the identification in Branch was not procured by an
unnecessarily suggestive procedure, based upon the policy set forth by
the Supreme Court, the Branch court could have brought the reliability
of the evidence into the scope of review in determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction.
By identifying the discrepancy as an element going to weight rather
than the sufficiency of the evidence, the court also implicitly delegated
the authority to determine the reliability of the evidence to the jury. 68
This delegation reflects the court's faith in the competency of the factfinding body, but it is inconsistent with established Supreme Court policy69 and opinions of legal and psychological commentators in the area of
eyewitness identifications. 70 Despite substantial evidence pointing to the
innocence of the accused, most jurors will place unwarranted faith in the
veracity of the eyewitness. 71 Therefore, the presence of eyewitness identification in a jury trial provides an increased likelihood that a conviction
will result. Notwithstanding the trust that the Branch court places in the
competency of the jury, trial courts should be aware that jurors may not
be cognizant of the hazards inherent in eyewitness identification
testimony.7 2
Criminal defense attorneys can reduce the impact of the Branch
court's holding by focusing the jury's attention on the weaknesses of eyewitness identification, 73 introducing expert testimony on factors that affect the accuracy of the identification, 74 and requesting special jury
. instructions on the fallability of eyewitness identification. 75 In addition,
ifthe identification procedure is suggestive, the defense attorney should
move to suppress the identification. 76 The court of appeals has failed to
address the problems underlying eyewitness testimony; therefore, it is im67. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
68. Branch, 305 Md. at 184, 502 A.2d at 499. The reviewing court cannot measure the
weight of the evidence. Cf Smith v. State, 51 Md. App. 408, 443 A.2d 985 (1982).
The function of the appellate court in reviewing a ruling on a motion for acquittal is
not to inquire into and measure the weight of evidence, but merely to determine
whether there is legally sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. Id. at 418, 443
A.2d at 991.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 33-54.
70. See supra text accompanying notes 20-26.
71. LOFTUS, supra note 20, at 9.
72. For a discussion of weaknesses of eyewitness identifications, see supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
73. Id.
74. See generally Grossman, supra note 65, at 99-108 (suggesting that expert psychological testimony is helpful in explaining the impact of suggestive procedures upon
reliability, but the use of expert testimony in every case involving eyewitness identification could cause delays effecting judicial economy).
75. For the leading decision on cautionary instructions, see U.S. v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d
552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stressing several factors which the jury should consider in weighing eyewitness testimony). See generally Woocher, supra note 17, at
1002-05.
76. See MD. R. 4-251 (motion in district court) and MD. R. 4-252 (mandatory motions
in circuit court).
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perative that counsel take measures to reduce the likelihood that the jury
will convict an innocent defendant on the basis of a mistaken
identification.
In Branch v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland perpetuates
the life of the anachronistic one-witness rule. Although the decision rests
upon a solid foundation of prior case law, it disregards the inherent
weaknesses of eyewitness identification testimony. The factual discrepancy in Branch presented the court of appeals with the opportunity to
adopt the Levi approach and consider the reliability of the evidence in
determining its sufficiency. Instead, the court employed a mechanical
application of the one-witness rule that creates a precedent with the potential to restrict the due process rights of persons criminally accused.
Lisa Kristine Hoffman

